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1577 
WHY OBERGEFELL SHOULD NOT IMPACT  
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL MARRIAGE LAWS 
INTRODUCTION 
Catalyzed by Massachusetts’s legalization of same-sex marriage in 
2003, the debate surrounding marriage equality surged to the forefront of 
this country’s public discourse, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 
momentous decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.
1
 Prior to Obergefell, thirty-
seven states and the District of Columbia had legalized same-sex 
marriage.
2
 Most of these jurisdictions instituted same-sex marriage 
judicially.
3
 
While Obergefell might have quelled the same-sex marriage debate in 
state and federal circles, discussions continue to surge within Native 
American nations.
4
 Prior to Obergefell, a number of individual tribes had 
definitively taken sides, either affirmatively allowing or banning same-sex 
marriage among their members.
5
 With same-sex marriage becoming the 
law of the land in the United States, some tribes “could become islands of 
nonconforming law” in which the union is still banned.6 In the wake of 
 
 
 1. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (holding 5–4 that 
same-sex marriage licenses and state recognition of same-sex marriages from other states are 
fundamental constitutional rights under substantive due process and equal protection); Robert Barnes, 
Supreme Court Rules Gay Couples Nationwide Have a Right to Marry, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gay-marriage-and-other-major-rulings-at-the-supreme-court/ 
2015/06/25/ef75a120-1b6d-11e5-bd7f-4611a60dd8e5_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S8NR-
EA6V (noting that Obergefell “marked the culmination of an unprecedented upheaval in public 
opinion and the nation’s jurisprudence”); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 
969–70 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the Massachusetts state constitution guarantees the right to same-
sex marriage). 
 2. Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl. 
org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/R5RD-3F53 (providing a survey and brief history of the proliferation of same-sex 
marriage law changes throughout the United States leading up to Obergefell).  
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Julian Brave NoiseCat, Fight for Marriage Equality Not Over on Navajo Nation, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/02/navajo-marriage-
equality_n_7709016.html, archived at perma.cc/YJ8T-BWHQ. This Note uses “Native American,” 
“American Indian,” and “Indian” interchangeably, reflecting the usage of federal statutory and case 
law. Similarly, “Indian nations,” “tribal nations,” “tribal sovereigns,” “tribal governments,” etc., are 
also used interchangeably.  
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Same-Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution, 61 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 53, 59–60 (2006). It is interesting to note that Fletcher’s description of “islands of non-
conforming law in an area where the American people appear to have spoken with finality” referred to 
tribes that allowed same-sex marriage while states surrounding the tribes still banned the union. Now 
that Obergefell has invalidated state bans, only the reverse is possible. Fletcher’s description now 
describes tribal jurisdictions that ban same-sex marriage. Still, Obergefell’s dissenters might point out 
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Obergefell, Native sovereigns continue to institute laws permitting and 
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.
7
  
The issue of same-sex marriage, therefore, continues to raise important 
questions related to American Indian nations’ status as third sovereigns—
within the United States, but separate from the federal and state 
governments.
8
 In an age in which “forgetting the third sovereign is 
endemic,”9 it is worth remembering the special status of the 566 federally 
recognized tribal nations
10
 whose members are simultaneously citizens of 
the United States, of their individual state, and of their tribal nation.
11
  
This Note explores what Obergefell means for members of American 
Indian nations, and it argues that Obergefell should not constrain tribal 
governments. Part I briefly recounts Obergefell, including the Court’s 
reasoning and language that might be pertinent for tribal sovereigns. Part 
II briefly surveys the status of tribal same-sex marriage laws to reveal the 
pluralism amongst the Native nations that have definitively decided the 
issue. Part III discusses how these tribes’ decisions are rooted in tradition 
and self-determination, two indeterminate concepts that contribute to 
Native pluralism on the issue. Part IV explores the interplay of tribal, state, 
and federal law, unpacking tribal nations’ special status as “domestic 
dependent nations,”12 and what this means for tribal marriage laws that 
accord or contrast with the laws of other jurisdictions. Finally, Part V 
argues that Obergefell should have only a limited, indirect impact on tribal 
marriage laws, and discusses why the “should” in this sentence and this 
Note’s title is both predictive and normative. 
I. OBERGEFELL 
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that the US Constitution 
guarantees same-sex marriage as a fundamental right under the due 
 
 
that the second half of Fletcher’s description (“where the American people appear to have spoken with 
finality”) does not apply to the Obergefell majority, because the dissenters characterize the holding as 
counter-majoritarian and contrary to history. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to 
retain the historic definition.”). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 71. 
 10. For more information about federally recognized tribes, including a directory, see Tribal 
Directory, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/OIS/TribalGovernment 
Services/TribalDirectory/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
 11. See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 63.  
 12. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/8
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process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
13
 The 
Court answered affirmatively both of the questions before it: “whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two 
people of the same sex,” and “whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires a State to recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and performed 
in a State which does grant that right.”14  
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion first described the history of 
societal views on marriage and same-sex relations, stressing that “the 
annals of human history reveal” the dignified status that marriage 
bestows.
15
 The majority implied that the concept of dignity surrounding 
marriage approached cultural universality, citing Confucius, Cicero, and 
other “references to the beauty of marriage in religious and philosophical 
texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, as well as in art and literature in 
all their forms.”16 Still, the Court emphasized that marriage is dynamic, 
having evolved throughout time and space, and that these changes “have 
strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage.”17 
The first and primary foundation upon which the Court based its 
decision was the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.18 The Court 
noted that it had invalidated parts of the Defense of Marriage Act just two 
years prior.
19
 Next, the Court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects “fundamental rights,” including the right to marriage.20 This right 
encompasses same-sex couples who wish to wed.
21
 The Court emphasized 
that the due process clause guarantees marriage rights to same-sex couples 
because marriage “is a keystone of our social order.”22 Because society 
 
 
 13. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). Obergefell reviewed a Sixth Circuit 
decision upholding state bans on same-sex marriage. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 
2014); see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Decide Marriage Rights for Gay Couples Nationwide, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/us/supreme-court-to-decide-
whether-gays-nationwide-can-marry.html?_r=0. When the Sixth Circuit upheld state bans on same-sex 
marriage, four other circuits had already overturned such state bans. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 
352 (4th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th 
Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).  
 14. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.  
 15. Id. at 2593–94.  
 16. Id. at 2594. The Court conceded that the historical view contemplates marriage as “a union 
between two persons of the opposite sex.” Id. 
 17. Id. at 2596. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–601. 
 19. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) 
(invalidating Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996))). 
 20. Id. at 2597–98 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 
374 (1978); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).  
 21. Id. at 2599. 
 22. Id. at 2601. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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structures social support and benefits around marital status, preventing a 
committed couple from accessing marriage has a destabilizing and 
stigmatizing effect.
23
 Importantly, the Court explained that “[t]he right to 
marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come 
not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed 
understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that 
remains urgent in our own era.”24 
Next, the Court moved to a shorter discussion about how its decision 
adheres to the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause.25 
Suggesting that due process rights and equal protection rights are related 
and sometimes overlap, the Court held that laws banning same-sex 
marriage deny equal protection to same-sex couples.
26
 
The Court then described how a wait-and-see approach would 
perpetuate inequality and continue to stigmatize same-sex couples.
27
 
Finally, the Court recognized that its holding obviated the need to answer 
the question about marriage recognition.
28
 After Obergefell, all states must 
now recognize validly performed same-sex marriages from other states.
29
 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote an especially critical dissenting opinion, 
accusing the majority of rewriting history.
30
 Roberts wrote that the 
majority undermined “a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of 
marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history.”31 
Like the majority, Roberts also named historical societies, but he claimed 
that a restrictive view of marriage was universal, citing “the Kalahari 
Bushmen and the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the Aztecs. Just who 
do we think we are?”32 He argued that the Court’s decision creates a 
slippery slope to polygamy, which—unlike same-sex marriage—at least 
has some historical precedent, according to Roberts.
33
 Roberts also 
 
 
 23. Id. at 2601–02. 
 24. Id. at 2602. 
 25. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–04; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any 
State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 26. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603–04 (noting that Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), was 
based on both due process and equal protection grounds). The Court did not describe a standard of 
scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation. 
 27. Id. at 2605–06. 
 28. Id. at 2607–08. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito each wrote their 
own dissenting opinions, as well. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 2612. 
 33. Id. at 2621–22. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/8
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criticized the majority for its “conclusory” equal-protection analysis.34  
Although it may have dismayed Chief Justice Roberts and other 
onlookers, Obergefell will go down as a landmark case and a historic step 
in the LGBTQ-rights movement. But despite Obergefell’s sweeping effect, 
the litany of societies and historical cultures invoked by both sides, and 
even the decision below in the Sixth Circuit,
35
 the Court’s Obergefell 
opinion did not reference Native Americans. 
II. TRIBAL SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAWS 
The federal government has virtually limitless legislative authority over 
American Indian sovereigns, though tribes retain broad authority, inherent 
in their preconstitutional sovereignty, over domestic relations.
36
 Thus, 
tribal sovereigns continue to vary widely in their legal treatment of same-
sex marriage despite Obergefell bringing consistency to all fifty states.  
While some have unequivocally taken sides, the vast majority of the 
566 federally recognized tribal sovereigns have laws or policies that are 
difficult to discern for a number of reasons. One reason is that many tribes 
“do not always make their laws public” or otherwise available to non-
members.
37
 Another complication is that news and online sources do not 
always provide reliable information about tribal laws.
38
 Additionally, not 
all tribes issue marriage licenses, so for many tribal nations, the matter of 
same-sex marriage may never arise.
39
 Still other tribal sovereigns reserve 
 
 
 34. Id. at 2623. 
 35. The Sixth Circuit’s decision made one passing reference to “Native Americans” in its 
argument that marriage restrictions need not trigger strict scrutiny. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 
412 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting NANCY F. COTT, A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that “the federal government encouraged or forced Native 
Americans to adopt [monogamy],” which has been a historically unquestioned restriction on 
marriage).  
 36. See infra Part IV. 
 37. William Yardley, A Washington State Indian Tribe Approves Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/us/12tribe.html. 
 38. See Ann E. Tweedy, Tribal Laws & Same-Sex Marriage: Theory, Process, and Content, 46 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 104, 109–10 (2015) (noting that news outlets falsely reported that the 
Iowa Tribe of Oklahoma had a ban on same-sex marriages, while the tribe’s court administrator 
disclaimed such information). Professor Tweedy’s article is commendable for its survey of tribal laws. 
Because of the difficulties of presenting a survey of all tribal laws on same-sex marriage, this Note 
does not purport to provide a comprehensive list. The tribal sovereigns that are named in this Part are 
confirmed by multiple sources, and, whenever possible, the primary legal document stating a 
sovereign’s standpoint is cited. 
 39. Mark P. Strasser, Tribal Marriages, Same-Sex Unions, and an Interstate Recognition 
Conundrum, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 234 & n.171 (2010). 
 Some sovereigns recently amended their laws to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples, alike. One example is the Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde. See Dean 
Rhodes, Tribal Council Approves New Marriage Ordinance, CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF GRAND 
RONDE (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.grandronde.org/news/smoke-signals/2015/10/29/tribal-council-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the right to perform marriages and govern domestic relations, but tether 
their marriage requirements to state-law parameters.
40
 Now that all states 
must issue licenses to same-sex couples and recognize same-sex marriages 
from other states,
41
 it is unclear whether tribes in this category will 
institute same-sex marriage for their members.
42
 Still, at the publication of 
this Note, at least sixteen tribal sovereigns allow for or support same-sex 
marriage, and at least eleven affirmatively ban it.
43
 
All in all, even though only a fraction of the 566 federally recognized 
tribes have taken a stance on same-sex marriage, the tribal legal landscape 
is already characterized by pluralism. Thus, even if Obergefell may have 
settled the same-sex marriage debate among states, tribal sovereigns will 
continue to grapple with the issue themselves, and the legal landscape will 
remain in flux in Native jurisdictions.  
A. Tribes that Allow or Support Same-Sex Marriage 
At least sixteen tribal sovereigns support and/or issue licenses for 
same-sex marriages: the Cheyenne-Arapaho,
44
 the Colville,
45
 the 
Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde,
46
 the Coquille,
47
 the Keweenaw Bay 
Indian Community,
48
 the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe,
49
 the Little Traverse 
 
 
approves-new-marriage-ordinance/#sthash.GM1g7aRV.yL2wjvAX.dpbs, archived at perma.cc/W3W 
7-2LKX (noting that the tribe’s law instituting the power to issue marriage licenses also contained a 
controversial non-discrimination clause that mandated that licenses be available to same-sex couples).  
 40. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE SAN CARLOS APACHE TRIBE, ARIZONA art. 
5, § XII (“The council shall have the power to regulate the domestic relations of members of the tribe, 
but all marriages in the future shall be in accordance with the State laws.”).  
 41. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–08 (2015).  
 42. The Eastern Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho Tribes officiated a same-sex marriage after 
Wyoming legalized the union, because the Tribes’ law is tied to state law. Tweedy, supra note 38, at 
122.  
 43. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 44. Heide Brandes, Oklahoma Gay Couple Marry Under Native American Law, REUTERS (Nov. 
1, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gaymarriage-oklahoma-idUSBRE9A00 
JW20131101, archived at http://perma.cc/7GH7-FAC8.  
 45. K.C. Mehaffey, Colville Tribes Vote to Recognize Same-Sex Unions, THE SPOKESMAN-
REVIEW (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2013/sep/08/colville-tribes-vote-to-
recognize-same-sex-unions/, archived at http://perma.cc/Q3QK-KVFH.  
 46. See Rhodes, supra note 39. 
 47. Bill Graves, Coquille Same-Sex Marriage Law Takes Effect, THE OREGONIAN (May 21, 
2009, 5:47 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/05/coquille_samesex_marriage_ 
law.html, archived at perma.cc/3G3K-4SWR.  
 48. See Tweedy, supra note 38, at 110–11; Dan Roblee, KBIC Legalizes Tribally Sanctioned 
Same-Sex Marriage, HOUGHTON DAILY MINING GAZETTE (June 10, 2015), http://www.miningjournal. 
net/page/content.detail/id/620457/KBIC-legalizes-tribally-sanctioned-same-sex-marriage.html?nav=52 
43, archived at http://perma.cc/538X-V9VA; KBIC General Election December 13, 2014 Unofficial 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/8
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Bay Bands of Odawa Indians,
50
 the Mashantucket Pequot,
51
 the Oneida 
Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin,
52
 the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi 
Indians,
53
 the Puyallup,
54
 the Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel,
55
 the 
Shoshone-Arapaho Tribes at Wind River,
56
 the Siletz,
57
 the Suquamish,
58
 
and the Tlingit and Haida.
59
  
The Coquille Indian Tribe is regarded as the first tribe to allow same-
sex marriage, passing legislation in 2008.
60
 The law took effect in 2009.
61
 
 
 
Results, KEWEENAW REP., http://www.keweenawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/KBIC-
Election-Results.jpg (last visited Apr. 6, 2016), archived at perma.cc/G973-TCYT.  
 49. Andrew Potts, 8th US Native American Tribe Allows Same-Sex Couples to Wed, 
GAYSTARNEWS (Nov. 16, 2013), http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/8th-us-native-american-tribe-
allows-same-sex-couples-wed161113, archived at http://perma.cc/5JBS-FCZB.  
 50. Sonya Houston, Tribe Marries Same-Sex Couple but State Won’t Recognize It, CNN (Mar. 
17, 2013, 5:41 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/17/politics/michigan-same-sex-marriage/index.ht 
ml, archived at http://perma.cc/25QX-3X7J.  
 51. MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ANN. tit. 6, ch. 3 (Supp. 2010-11), available at 
http://www.mptnlaw.com/laws/2010-2011%20Pocket%20Part%20to%202008%20Tribal%20Laws.pd 
f; Trudy Ring, No Reservations, THE ADVOCATE (July 29, 2010, 3:05 PM), http://www.advocate. 
com/news/news-features/2010/07/29/no-reservations, archived at perma.cc/BK37-EGEF.  
 52. Dawn Walschinski, Oneida’s Marriage Law Changed to Allow Same Sex Marriages, 
KALIHWISAKS, http://oneidanation.org/newspaper/page.aspx?id=41256, archived at https://perma.cc/L 
8M8-H9QE. In May of 2015, the Oneida changed its marriage law from restricting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples to allowing for same-sex marriage. Id.; see also ONEIDA TRIBE MARRIAGE LAW 
ch. 71, §§ 71.3–71.4 (2015), available at https://oneida-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ 
Marriage-Law-BC-05-25-16-A.pdf. An older version of the statute had a restrictive definition of 
marriage. See ONEIDA TRIBE MARRIAGE LAW ch. 71 (2010) (on file with the Washington University 
Law Review).  
 53. POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS MARRIAGE CODE § 1.06(j) (2013), available at 
http://www.pokagonband-nsn.gov/sites/default/files/assets/group/tribal-council/form/2013/marriage-co 
de-3-9-13-1369-1173.pdf; John Eby, Same-Sex Couple Says, ‘I Do,’ LEADER PUBLICATIONS (June 20, 
2013, 4:46 PM), http://www.leaderpub.com/2013/06/20/same-sex-couple-says-i-do/. 
 54. Matt Nagle, Puyallup Tribe Recognizes Same-Sex Marriages, TACOMA WKLY. (July 16, 
2014), http://www.tacomaweekly.com/news/view/puyallup-tribe-recognizes-same-sex-marriages/. 
 55. ICTMN Staff, Santa Ysabel Tribe First in California to Support Same-Sex Marriage, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (June 28, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ 
2013/06/28/santa-ysabel-tribe-first-california-support-same-sex-marriage-150179. Although the Santa 
Ysabel does not issue marriage licenses, the tribal council passed a policy expressing support for the 
union. Tweedy, supra note 38, at 107.  
 56. Wind River Tribal Judge Presides over First Same-Sex Marriage, INDIANZ.COM (Nov. 17, 
2014), http://www.indianz.com/News/2014/015673.asp. The Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho 
Tribes at Wind River officiated a same-sex marriage after Wyoming legalized same-sex marriage. 
Tweedy, supra note 38, at 111.  
 57. SILETZ MARRIAGE ORDINANCE, SILETZ TRIBAL CODE § 8.403 (2015), available at 
http://www.ctsi.nsn.us/uploads/downloads/Ordinances/Marriage%20Ordinance%205-15-15.pdf.  
 58. Yardley, supra note 37. 
 59. Tweedy, supra note 38, at 110; Melissa Griffiths, Same-Sex Marriage Mixes with Tribal 
Sovereignty, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Feb. 24, 2015, 1:03 AM), http://juneauempire.com/local/2015-02-
23/same-sex-marriage-mixes-tribal-sovereignty.  
 60. Trista Wilson, Comment, Changed Embraces, Changes Embraced? Renouncing the 
Heterosexist Majority in Favor of a Return to Traditional Two-Spirit Culture, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
161, 181 (2012). 
 61. See Graves, supra note 47. 
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The Tribe, whose lands are located in Washington and Oregon, enacted 
the law at a time in which these states had not yet legalized same-sex 
marriage.
62
 After the Coquille, other tribes followed suit, with the bulk of 
tribes (Cheyenne-Arapaho, Colville, Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, Little 
Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, Pokagon Band of Potawatomi 
Indians, and Santa Ysabel) legalizing same-sex marriage in the same 
year—2013.63  
Some tribal sovereigns, such as the Cheyenne-Arapaho, Coquille, and 
the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, issued licenses for same-
sex marriages in states that banned such unions at the time.
64
 In fact, the 
Keweenaw Bay Indian Community’s affirmation of same-sex marriage 
was at least partially a reaction to the Sixth Circuit’s decision to uphold 
state marriage bans.
65
 Other sovereigns, such as the Mashantucket Pequot, 
Santa Ysabel, and Suquamish, decided to allow same-sex marriages after 
their respective adjacent state governments had already begun issuing 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
66
 
Still more tribal sovereigns may now allow for same-sex marriage, 
because some sovereigns tie their marriage-eligibility requirements to state 
law. For example, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians will 
issue marriage licenses to citizens that meet Michigan’s eligibility 
requirements “in terms of the sex of the parties to the proposed 
marriage.”67 Michigan was one of the last states to allow same-sex 
marriage, defending its ban before the Supreme Court in Obergefell.
68
 
Now that Michigan’s state ban has been overturned, same-sex marriage 
has presumably become legal in the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians, as well.
69
  
 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. See supra notes 44, 45, 49, 50, 53 & 55. 
 64. Brandes, supra note 44 (Oklahoma); Graves, supra note 47 (Washington and Oregon); 
Houston, supra note 50 (Michigan). 
 65. Dan Roblee, Big Decisions: KBIC Members to Vote on Marijuana, Same Sex Marriage, 
HOUGHTON DAILY MINING GAZETTE (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.mininggazette.com/page/content.det 
ail/id/538875.html (noting that the tribal council member who proposed the referendum on same-sex 
marriage was reacting to the Sixth Circuit’s decision). 
 66. Ring, supra note 51 (Connecticut); Yardley, supra note 37 (Washington, after the state began 
allowing same-sex marriages); ICTMN Staff, supra note 55 (California). 
 67. SAULT TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, TRIBAL CODE § 31.104 (2015), available at 
https://www.saulttribe.com/images/stories/government/tribalcode/chaptr31.pdf.  
 68. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). 
 69. Still, this is unclear in this case, as another provision in the tribal code limits recognition of 
marriage to male-female couples. SAULT TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, TRIBAL CODE § 31.102 (2015), 
available at https://www.saulttribe.com/images/stories/government/tribalcode/chaptr31.pdf (recognizing 
“as a valid and binding marriage any marriage between a man and a woman”). It is also possible that 
the issue of “licensing” and “recognizing” same-sex marriage could be separated for the tribe, just as 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/8
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Most tribal sovereigns that instituted same-sex marriages did so via 
legislative action through their respective tribal councils.
70
 Others did so 
administratively. For example, the Cheyenne-Arapaho’s marriage laws do 
not explicitly specify gender, and so the tribal government simply began 
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
71
 Since many other tribal 
marriage laws are sex-neutral,
72
 there may be more tribal sovereigns that 
join ranks with the Cheyenne-Arapaho. The Keweenaw Bay Indian 
Community’s establishment of tribal same-sex marriage is unique in that 
the Tribal Council’s action was the result of a popular tribal referendum.73  
Also, each tribal sovereign has its own restrictions on marriage 
eligibility. To illustrate, the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indian’s 
Marriage Code has a number of requirements: at least one partner must be 
a citizen of the tribe, both parties must be age eighteen or over, both must 
have the mental capacity to consent, both must be tested for HIV, neither 
may be related to the other by blood closer than third-degree cousins, and 
both must receive “written educational materials from the Band regarding 
HIV[] [and] prenatal care,” among other requirements.74 While each tribe 
has its own set of marriage criteria, every Native sovereign requires that at 
least one partner be a citizen of the tribe.
75
 
Still other Native nations do not perform same-sex marriages at all, but 
instead offer the equivalent of a civil union.
76
 Sovereigns in this category 
include the Confederated Tribes of Umatilla, the Tulalip Tribes, and the 
Ponca Tribe of Nebraska.
77
 And other sovereigns do not issue marriage 
licenses but mandate the recognition of marriages (presumably including 
same-sex ones) performed by foreign, state, or other tribal sovereigns.
78
 
B. Tribes That Ban Same-Sex Marriage 
At least eleven tribal sovereigns have legislative bans on same-sex 
 
 
the Supreme Court defined the issues of licensing and recognition as two separate questions. See 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (stating the two questions under review); see also Tweedy, supra note 
38, at 124–25. 
 70. See, e.g., COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES, COLVILLE BUSINESS COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 
INDEX (2013), available at http://www.colvilletribes.com/media/files/5-2-13.pdf (establishing same-
sex marriage in resolution 2013-344l&j). 
 71. Brandes, supra note 44. 
 72. Tweedy, supra note 38, at 128–29.  
 73. Roblee, supra note 48; KBIC General Election December 13, 2014 Unofficial Results, supra 
note 48. 
 74. POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS MARRIAGE CODE § 2.01 (2013). 
 75. See, e.g., id. 
 76. See Tweedy, supra note 38, at 126–27.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 130–31. 
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marriage, including the two largest nations, the Navajo Nation and the 
Cherokee Nation.
79
 Other tribes with restrictive marriage laws include the 
Ak-Chin,
80
 the Blue Lake Rancheria,
81
 the Chickasaw Nation,
82
 the 
Kalispel Indian Community,
83
 the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma,
84
 the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation,
85
 the Nez Perce,
86
 the Sac and Fox Tribe of the 
Mississippi in Iowa,
87
 and the Seminole Nation.
88
 Many more Native 
sovereigns have laws with sex- or gender-specific language in their 
definitions of marriage, but lack any provision that affirmatively bans 
same-sex marriage.
89
  
It is worth briefly recounting how the Cherokee and Navajo marriage 
bans came to be. In 2004, the Cherokee Nation’s marriage law did not 
have gender-specific language, and two Cherokee women, Dawn 
McKinley and Kathy Reynolds, easily obtained an application for a 
marriage license.
90
 However, the tribal government refused to accept their 
completed application.
91
 Soon after the Nation denied the McKinley-
Reynolds application, the Cherokee Tribal Council unanimously amended 
 
 
 79. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 55; Wilson, supra note 60, at 177. Although it is less clear than for 
the above-mentioned tribes, other tribal nations have also been known to prohibit same-sex marriage, 
including the Muscogee Creek Nation and the Iowa Tribe of Oklahoma. Tribal Marriage Equality, 
NATIVEOUT, http://nativeout.com/twospirit-rc/tribal-marriage-equality/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). 
 80. See Felicia Fonseca, Gay Marriage Is Legal but Not on Tribal Lands, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Nov. 27, 2015, 10:22 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/cd8de7dfe71c41e69723e0bebd0887d8/gay-
marriage-legal-not-tribal-lands (noting that a tribal member is suing the Ak-Chin to challenge its ban 
on same-sex marriage).  
 81. See Tweedy, supra note 38, at 131 (citing BLUE LAKE RANCHERIA ORDINANCE 01-01, § 6(c) 
(2001), available at http://www.bluelakerancheria-nsn.gov/BLR_Marriage_Ordinance_01-01.pdf). 
 82. CHICKASAW NATION CODE tit. 6, § 6-103.2 (2014), available at https://www.chickasaw.net/ 
Documents/Long-Term/Chickasaw-Code/Title-06.aspx (defining marriage as “between a man and a 
woman”); see also id. § 6-103.5 (prohibiting recognition for citizens with same-sex marriages 
performed in other jurisdictions). 
 83. THE LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE KALISPEL TRIBE OF INDIANS ch. 8, §§ 1.03(3)–2.01 
(2014), available at http://9ef74bdbbf37fca83a69-2b1e9749bacf0913693514d94e391aa4.r28.cf2.rac 
kcdn.com/pdf-uploads/Legal/KTI_LOC_20141029v2.pdf. 
 84. KICKAPOO TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ORDINANCE ch. A, art. 12 
(2011), available at http://www.kickapootribeofoklahoma.com/forms/marriagedivorceordinance.pdf. 
 85. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-104 (2001), available at 
http://www.creeksupremecourt.com/images/code/webver/title6.pdf. 
 86. See Tweedy, supra note 38, at 131 (citing NEZ PERCE CODE tit. 4, § 4-5-1(o), available at 
http://nezperce.org/~code/pdf%20convert%20files/Code%20with%20TOC%208dec15.pdf).  
 87. CODE OF THE SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA tit. 6, § 6-1203(c) (2014), 
available at http://www.meskwaki.org/Titles/Title%206.%20Family%20Relations%20%20FINAL% 
2009.03.2014.pdf. 
 88. SEMINOLE NATION CODE OF LAWS tit. 13A, § 104 (2012), available at http://sno-
nsn.gov/Government/GeneralCouncil/CodeofLaws/Title13C2.pdf. 
 89. See Tweedy, supra note 38, at 140–41. 
 90. Wilson, supra note 60, at 178. 
 91. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/8
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the marriage law to limit marriages to male-female couples.
92
 
In the wake of the controversy surrounding the Cherokee Nation’s 
decision to ban same-sex marriages, the Navajo Nation adopted the Diné 
Marriage Act of 2005.
93
 The Diné Marriage Act states that “[m]arriage 
between persons of the same sex is void and prohibited.”94 Although the 
Nation’s President, Joe Shirley, Jr., vetoed the Act, the Tribal Council 
overrode the veto, and the Diné Marriage Act is still good law in the 
Navajo Nation.
95
 Critics of the Diné Marriage Act continue to challenge 
the Navajo Nation’s ban on same-sex marriage,96 including former 
President Joe Shirley, Jr., who stated that the Navajo Nation has “some 
catching up here to do with our laws, our codes and what we operate our 
government under.”97 
Finally, although it is difficult to track down legislative history for 
tribal sovereigns’ bans on same-sex marriage, the dates associated with 
relevant code revisions can shed some insight. For example, the 
Chickasaw Nation’s tribal code was amended as recently as September 30, 
2014, and contains one provision that defines marriage as between one 
man and one woman and another provision that denies recognition to 
same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions.
98
 The Kalispel Indian 
Community’s prohibition is likewise manifested in the Community’s code 
of laws, which was revised as late as October of 2014.
99
 Furthermore, the 
specific provisions in the Seminole Nation’s prohibition on same-sex 
marriage are dated 2012.
100
 These dates fall within with the larger national 
debate on same-sex marriage and may indicate that these tribes amended 
their laws in order to act decisively on the issue for their sovereign 
populations. 
III. REASONS TRIBES ENACT MARRIAGE LAWS: SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
 
 92. Id. at 178–79. 
 93. Id. at 180; Diné Marriage Act, 20th Navajo Nation Council, CAP-29-05 (2005), available at 
http://www.navajocourts.org/Resolutions/29-05%20Marriage%20Act.pdf. 
 94. Diné Marriage Act § 2(B). 
 95. Wilson, supra note 60, at 180. 
 96. States May Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, But Navajo Nation Won’t, NPR (Jan. 9, 2014, 
1:46 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2014/01/09/261048308/states-may-recognize-same-
sex-marriages-but-navajo-nation-wont; see also COAL. FOR DINÉ EQUAL., http://www.navajoequa 
lity.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). 
 97. Shondiin Silversmith, A Question of Human Rights: Is It Time to Repeal the Diné Marriage 
Act?, NAVAJO TIMES (July 4, 2013), http://www.navajotimes.com/news/2013/0713/070413marriage. 
php#.VERxskvC5G4. 
 98. CHICKASAW NATION CODE tit. 6, §§ 6-103.2, 6-103.5 (2014). 
 99. THE LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE KALISPEL TRIBE OF INDIANS ch. 8, §§ 8-1.03–8-2.01 
(2014). 
 100. SEMINOLE NATION CODE OF LAWS tit. 13A, § 104 (2012). 
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AND TRADITION 
Just as there is variation among the Native sovereigns that have taken a 
stance on same-sex marriage, Native sovereigns may also have myriad 
reasons that motivate their respective decisions. Still, two common 
rationales emerge from the comments of tribal council members and the 
text of tribal statutes: self-determination and tradition. “Self-
determination” refers to the Native sovereigns’ inherent ability to govern 
themselves and their own internal affairs.
101
 “Tradition,” as will be 
explained, has a more complicated interpretation that has become more 
difficult to discern post-European contact. Importantly, as advocates on 
both sides of the debate have demonstrated, “self-determination” and 
“tradition” are indeterminate and can cut either way on the issue of same-
sex marriage.  
A. Self-Determination 
Some tribal governments have passed pro-same-sex marriage laws as 
an exercise of their authority as sovereigns. For instance, a statement of 
self-determination can be found within the text of the resolution affirming 
same-sex marriage for the Colville: “To approve in the spirit of fairness 
and tolerance, exercising our authority as a sovereign nation, the Colville 
Business Council Law & Justice Committee support[s] and acknowledges 
same-sex marriage.”102 
Exercising self-determination can be a reactive move in the face of 
threats to Native identity. For instance, when the Suquamish Tribe began 
allowing same-sex marriages in 2011, many saw it as “an important act of 
self-determination. . . . [and] an effort to assert tribal culture and authority 
over outside influences by people whose very identities have been under 
assault for more than two centuries, since non-Indian settlers began 
arriving in the Pacific Northwest.”103 In other words, not only was passing 
the law on same-sex marriage an exercise in self-government, but it was 
also a form of identity assertion. Thus, self-determinative action can also 
be reactive to other sovereigns, such as the federal and state 
governments.
104
  
 
 
 101. For a more in-depth discussion of tribes’ special status as sovereigns, see infra Part IV. 
 102. COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES, supra note 70 (emphasis added). 
 103. Yardley, supra note 37. 
 104. For instance, the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community’s decision to propose same-sex 
marriage in a popular referendum may have been at least partially in response to the Sixth Circuit’s 
affirmation of state bans on same-sex marriage. Roblee, supra note 65. 
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Self-determination may also involve advancing values that are seen as 
important to tribal culture. Many tribes that legalized same-sex marriage 
did so while citing equality and justice. For example, when the Santa 
Ysabel legalized same-sex marriages in 2013, Tribal Chairman Virgil 
Perez explained that the tribe was exercising its right to self-govern in 
order to promote equality, stating, “Native Americans have fought hard to 
establish and protect their own rights, and Santa Ysabel is determined to 
support our own, and other same-sex couples in their struggle to be 
recognized and treated fairly as citizens of this great nation.”105 Similarly, 
when the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians began recognizing 
same-sex marriage, one official stated that the move “advance[d] tribal 
sovereignty and self-determination by utilizing the tribe’s own values and 
principles as its source of law, instead of conforming to outside 
sources.”106 
However, as easily as self-determination can be an argument for 
supporting same-sex marriage, it may also support a tribal sovereign’s 
decision to ban same-sex marriage. In fact, Native nations may be 
especially likely to cite self-determination as a reason for supporting bans 
on same-sex marriage now that the unions are legal in all states.
107
 For 
instance, the “Family Relations” title of the Sac and Fox Tribe’s code of 
laws, which includes a ban on same-sex marriages,
108
 begins with a 
purpose that strongly invokes self-determination: 
 The Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa has the inherent 
sovereign power to regulate the family relations of its members. . . . 
No more important power is exercised by Indian Tribes than the 
power to protect and govern the family relations of their members. 
The purpose of this Title is to inform Sac & Fox Tribal members of 
that inherent sovereign authority and enable them to use their own 
Tribal forum which will use Meskwaki values, beliefs and religion 
to resolve and bring healing to Meskwaki families.
109
  
Similarly, the sponsor of the Navajo Diné Marriage Act stated that the 
“sovereignty of the Navajo Nation was the basis for the marriage act.”110 
 
 
 105. ICTMN Staff, supra note 55. 
 106. Brenda Austin, Little Traverse Band Recognizes Same-Sex Marriages, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Mar. 28, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/03/28/li 
ttle-traverse-band-recognizes-same-sex-marriages-148418. 
 107. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 108. CODE OF THE SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA tit. 6, § 6-1203(c) (2014), 
available at http://www.meskwaki.org/Titles/Title%206.%20Family%20Relations%20%20FINAL%2 
009.03.2014.pdf. 
 109. Id. § 6-1011.  
 110. Same-Sex Marriage Ban Becomes Law, NBC NEWS (June 13, 2005, 2:47 PM),  
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This shows that as much as tribal sovereigns can cite self-determination as 
a reason to support tribal same-sex marriages, other Native nations can use 
the same line of reasoning to restrict tribal same-sex marriages.  
The Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin might be the best example 
of how the same argument about self-determination can support either a 
same-sex marriage ban or its authorization. The Oneida Tribe had a law 
banning same-sex marriage until May of 2015, when the law was amended 
to allow for same-sex marriage.
111
 Interestingly, both versions of the law 
cite the same self-determinative “Purpose” statement: “to exercise the 
sovereign right of the Oneida tribe to regulate the rights and 
responsibilities relating to marriage.”112  
But the picture becomes even more complicated. The Oneida Tribe 
also illustrates how marriage is an especially complex area of the law 
when it comes to self-determination, because in some instances, having an 
assimilationist marriage law might promote tribal governmental power 
more than having a nonconforming one.
113
 One member of the Oneida 
Tribal Council said that the Tribe’s same-sex marriage ban originally 
existed merely to comply with Wisconsin law.
114
 While it may appear that 
this reasoning undermines self-determination, the Tribal Council wanted 
Oneida marriage licenses “to be recognized . . . everywhere,” which it felt 
would only be possible with a compliant marriage law.
115
 So, in order for 
the Tribe to support self-determination by issuing marriage licenses with 
meaning, the Tribe paradoxically had to undermine self-determination by 
instituting an assimilationist marriage law. Now that Obergefell has 
removed all state bans,
116
 the self-determination justification may have lost 
a layer of complexity.
117
 Still, it is likely that self-determination will 
 
 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8206025/ns/us_news-life/t/same-sex-marriage-ban-becomes-law/#.VGUz 
7Ydpv8E. However, one commentator suggests that the Navajo’s passage of the Diné Marriage Act 
reflected the federal policy under George W. Bush of banning same-sex marriage. See Brave NoiseCat, 
supra note 4. If this is true, then it undercuts Navajo self-determination. 
 111. Compare ONEIDA TRIBE MARRIAGE LAW ch. 71, § 71.3(d) (2010) (on file with the 
Washington University Law Review) (defining marriage as creating a legal status “of husband and 
wife”), with ONEIDA TRIBE MARRIAGE LAW ch. 71, § 71.3(d) (2015), available at https://oneida-
nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Marriage-Law-BC-05-25-16-A.pdf (defining marriage as 
creating a legal status “of spouses”).  
 112. ONEIDA TRIBE MARRIAGE LAW ch. 71, § 71.1 (2010); ONEIDA TRIBE MARRIAGE LAW ch. 
71, § 71.1 (2015). 
 113. See Walschinski, supra note 52.  
 114. Id. One commentator also suggests that the Cherokee Nation instituted its ban on same-sex 
marriage, in part, to accord with Oklahoma law at the time. See Tweedy, supra note 38, at 137. 
 115. See Walschinski, supra note 52. 
 116. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 117. This is assuming that other sovereigns will not refuse to recognize marriage licenses from 
tribes that ban same-sex marriage. Given the fact that the state of Wisconsin originally threatened to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/8
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continue to be an argument both for and against tribal same-sex marriages. 
B. Tradition 
Similarly, tribal sovereigns have cited “tradition” as an argument both 
to support same-sex marriages and to oppose them.
118
 When Native 
sovereigns argue that tradition supports same-sex marriage, they usually 
point to a documented history of a “two-spirit” (non-gender conforming) 
role within the tribe; when sovereigns argue that tradition prohibits same-
sex marriage, they usually point to a need to protect the “traditional” 
family. Both phenomena are discussed below. 
1. The Two-Spirit Tradition as a Foundation for Same-Sex Marriage 
A number of tribal sovereigns that have adopted same-sex marriage 
have done so explicitly in recognition of the tribe’s historic inclusion of 
the two-spirit identity.
119
 For example, Colville Council Chair Michael 
Finley argued that two-spirit individuals have “always been accepted,” and 
that the Colville’s same-sex marriage law codifies historical and cultural 
acceptance of tribal members who do not conform to traditional gender 
roles and/or who are attracted to members of the same sex.
120
 Also, one 
member of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community cited a two-spirit 
tradition in support of the sovereign’s resolution in support of same-sex 
marriage, stating, “[As] [p]eople outside of the Anglo norm we feel are 
touched by the Great Spirit. . . . [Two-spirit tribe members] were raised by 
the community and helped to do what they do. We didn’t ban them. There 
was no abnormality.”121 Similarly, Puyallup Council Member Maggie 
Edwards cited a two-spirit history when drafting the tribe’s resolution 
affirming same-sex marriage:  
 
 
refuse recognition of Oneida marriage licenses absent a same-sex-marriage ban, along with the 
momentum of pro-same-sex-marriage sentiment, such a situation is not unthinkable. Walschinski, 
supra note 52. This means that the reverse of the Oneida’s situation may occur, and tribes may have to 
undermine self-determination and have permissive same-sex marriage laws when they violate tribal 
tradition (undermining self-determination) in order to have meaningful marriage licenses (expressing 
self-determination). Of course, an easy, pro-native solution is that all sovereigns should recognize 
tribal marriage licenses, no matter what.  
 118. See Tweedy, supra note 38, at 154 (“Sweeping generalizations about tribal traditions are 
made on both sides of the same-sex marriage controversy.”). Interestingly, this draws a parallel to the 
divided Obergefell court, as both the majority and the chief dissenting opinion pointed to historical-
cultural examples. See supra notes 17, 33 and accompanying text. 
 119. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 38, at 120 (noting that the Little Traverse instituted same-sex 
marriage partly because “recognizing same-sex relationships was consistent with the Tribe’s oral 
history”).  
 120. Mehaffey, supra note 45. 
 121. Roblee, supra note 65. 
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WHEREAS, LGBT, (Lesbian, Gay, Bi-Sexual and Transgendered) 
persons have been acknowledged in tribal societies pre-European 
Colonization of America; and [in] a good and respectful way, they 
have been known in tribal custom and tradition as “Two-Spirit 
People” and this refers to the traditional belief that LGBT people 
have both a Male and Female Spirit inside them, which allows them 
to transcend traditional gender barriers . . . .
122
 
As the above clause suggests, the precise history of the status of two-spirit 
individuals is difficult to ascertain because European contact disrupted 
traditional, pre-contact ways of tribal life.
123
 Also, anthropological and 
other academic study of the two-spirit role did not develop until the 
twentieth century, long after the fact of European contact.
124
 Still, it is 
believed that there is documented evidence for two-spirit and non-gender-
conforming roles in at least 155 tribes, and it is possible that the presence 
of a two-spirit role was even more widespread.
125
 The two-spirit identity 
was not limited to a particular geographic area within the continent, and it 
has been described as “one of ‘the most widely shared features of North 
American societies.’”126  
Although the phrase “two-spirit” is typically used today to describe any 
Native American individual who identifies as LGBTQ, the traditional two-
spirit role in tribes was not strictly analogous to modern LGBTQ 
Natives.
127
 Two-spirit individuals were often not characterized by sexual 
orientation (i.e., as “homosexual”) in the same way as modern LGB 
individuals.
128
 For one thing, two-spirit people often assumed the work 
 
 
 122. Nagle, supra note 54. 
 123. Jeffery S. Jacobi, Note, Two Spirits, Two Eras, Same Sex: For a Traditionalist Perspective 
on Native American Tribal Same-Sex Marriage Policies, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 823, 834 (2006). 
One queer theorist eloquently describes the indeterminacy of ascertaining “tradition” after European 
contact: 
What constitutes tradition? Who decides, and under what circumstances are such 
determinations made? Or, put another way, can the effort to locate tradition be distinguished 
entirely from the process of imperial interpellation, including its heteronomaritive 
dimensions? . . . [A]nd how might such identities be dependent on ideologies of straightness?  
MARK RIFKIN, WHEN DID INDIANS BECOME STRAIGHT? 21 (2011). 
 124. Jacobi, supra note 123, at 838. 
 125. Id.; Wilson, supra note 60, at 169. 
 126. Jacobi, supra note 123, at 834 (quoting WILL ROSCOE, CHANGING ONES: THIRD AND 
FOURTH GENDERS IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA 7 (1998)). 
 127. Id. at 835. In the text that follows, I illustrate the two-spirit identity with examples from two 
particular tribes: the Navajo and the Lakota. Although a two-spirit identity was common to many 
tribes across the continent, the role varied from tribe to tribe. While I recognize that it is improper and 
inaccurate to speak of two-spirit people as a monolith, I will draw upon generalities for the purpose of 
this discussion. 
 128. Id. For a discussion of modern navigation of the two-spirit identity, see Samantha Mesa-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/8
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roles of the gender that did not typically align with their sex determined at 
birth.
129
 In other words, “male-bodied” two-spirits adopted the roles of 
women, and vice versa. For this very reason, some tribes highly regarded 
their two-spirit members, while others regarded their differences with fear. 
For example, Navajo two-spirit people were called nádleehé, or “he 
changes,” and they were deeply respected for their perceived ability to 
perform tasks associated with multiple genders, as well as for their 
compassion and care.
130
 However, while Lakota two-spirit people, or 
winkte, were valued and recognized as wakan (powerful or sacred), these 
same qualities roused fear.
131
  
While two-spirit people often engaged in same-sex sexual relations, it 
was rare (and in some cases, considered unthinkable) for them to engage 
in sex with each other.
132
 This highlights the tribal understanding that two-
spirit status was not necessarily a strict sexual orientation, but perhaps 
more of a gender identity. So, while two-spirit sex was homosexual in that 
it involved partners of the same birth-determined sex, it was heterosexual 
in gender; that is, when a two-spirit individual had sex with a man, it was 
usually not seen as homosexual sex, but rather sex between a man and a 
two-spirit person.
133
 
It follows that marriages between pairs of two-spirit individuals rarely 
occurred, if ever.
134
 However, marriages between a two-spirit individual 
and a tribal member of the same birth-determined sex were common.
135
 
This was especially true in polygamous marriages. For example, Lakota 
winktes could marry, but usually only to men that already had other 
wives.
136
 Tribal attitudes towards such marriages, however, seemed to 
have been more ambivalent.
137
 In Navajo history, nádleehé were often 
 
 
Miles, Two Spirit: The Trials and Tribulations of Gender Identity in the 21st Century, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Jan. 13, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ 
2015/01/13/two-spirit-trials-and-tribulations-gender-identity-21st-century-158686.  
 129. Mesa-Miles, supra note 128. 
 130. Jacobi, supra note 123, at 839–40. 
 131. ROYAL B. HASSRICK, THE SIOUX: LIFE AND CUSTOMS OF A WARRIOR SOCIETY 123 (1964). 
 132. Jacobi, supra note 123, at 835–36. 
 133. Id. at 836. For a critical take on two-spirit relations as a justification for modern, non-tribal 
same-sex marriage, see Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and 
Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1535 (1993) (arguing that using such gendered historical relations as a justification for modern 
same-sex marriage will perpetuate a patriarchal and oppressive model of the institution of marriage). 
For a disambiguation of “sex” from “gender,” see generally Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender 
from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 
YALE L.J. 1 (1995). 
 134. Polikoff, supra note 133, at 1540. 
 135. Jacobi, supra note 123, at 837. 
 136. Id. at 843. 
 137. Id. at 837. 
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discouraged from marrying, but marriages happened nevertheless.
138
 Still, 
even if more formal marriages were not recognized, informal cohabitation 
with two-spirits may have been more common.
139
 And, at least as seen by 
a handful of state courts at the turn of the twentieth century, many tribes 
recognized cohabitation as constituting a kind of marriage, anyway.
140
 
It is difficult to know whether tribal members looked down upon two-
spirit relationships organically or because of European influence, since 
ethnographic and other cultural studies of tribes and the status of two-spirit 
people were undertaken long after European contact.
141
 It is known, 
however, that early European arrivers to the Americas disparaged two-
spirit people and cited the identity as evidence of indigenous Americans’ 
cultural inferiority.
142
 As European contact and suppression of Native 
culture increased, two-spirit culture became further marginalized (even 
within tribes), and “in many cases, it was altogether hidden or 
eliminated.”143 One modern-day result of this may be that “a large faction 
of Native Americans condemn homosexuality and completely reject same-
sex unions largely because of the influence of European and American 
religion and culture.”144 For this reason, there is tension between “the 
modern attitude toward same-sex marriage and the two-spirit tradition 
within Indian culture, provoked perhaps by the ‘Christianization’ of many 
Native Americans.”145 Still, as made apparent by the Colville and Puyallup 
tribes, American Indian proponents of same-sex marriage often turn to the 
historical role of two-spirit people to bolster their arguments. 
2. Traditional Family Roles as a Justification for Bans on Same-Sex 
Marriage 
Tribes that oppose same-sex marriage also use arguments of tradition 
as ammunition in the debate. For instance, the Navajo’s Diné Marriage 
Act, which outlaws same-sex marriage, states that one of its purposes is 
 
 
 138. Id. at 840.  
 139. Id. at 844. 
 140. See, e.g., Earl v. Godley, 44 N.W. 254, 254 (Minn. 1890) (“And in respect to this Indian 
custom it is found that . . . the man and woman would thereupon . . . live and cohabit together as 
husband and wife without other or further marriage ceremony . . . .”); Ortley v. Ross, 110 N.W. 982, 
982 (Neb. 1907) (“The evidence shows that . . . the only ceremony requisite was a mutual agreement 
between the parties to live together as husband and wife . . . .”); Cyr v. Walker, 116 P. 931, 934 (Okla. 
1911) (“Mere meeting and cohabitation as husband and wife constituted a marriage . . . .”).  
 141. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 142. Wilson, supra note 60, at 172.  
 143. Id. at 173. 
 144. Jacobi, supra note 123, at 825. 
 145. Wilson, supra note 60, at 173–74. 
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“to preserve and strengthen family values.”146 Despite the well-
documented historical evidence of the Navajo two-spirit, or nádleehé,
147
 
the sponsor of the Diné Marriage Act argued that the tribe’s ban on same-
sex marriage stems from a traditional prohibition against marriage 
between individuals of the same clan within the Navajo Nation, stating: 
“Any marriage not based on our marriage ceremony and clan system will 
only destroy us as a nation. Likewise, any marriage not based on our 
marriage ceremony and clan system is not a basic family unit as we know 
it under Navajo tradition and culture.”148 His statement seems to assume 
that a same-sex marriage or a marriage involving nádleehé would fall 
outside the traditional Navajo clan system. 
The Navajo Nation is not the only tribal sovereign to hear arguments 
that tradition mandates the exclusion of same-sex tribal marriages. During 
the heated debate in the Cherokee Nation, Todd Hembree, the attorney for 
the Cherokee Tribal Council, argued that “Cherokees have a strong 
traditional sense of marriage,” and that “there’s never been a tribal 
recognition of same-sex marriage.”149 Similarly, the tribal court’s reason 
for refusing to accept the marriage application of McKinley and Reynolds 
was that it “would only recognize ‘traditional’ marriages.”150 Here, it 
seems as though the Cherokee’s definition of “traditional marriage” aligns 
with “tradition” in the European, Christian sense, to the exclusion of same-
sex marriages. 
Since tradition is such an integral part of tribal identity and 
sovereignty, it is natural for both factions of a debate to argue that 
tradition is on their side. However, “historical Native American religious 
and cultural tradition is vastly different from majoritarian Euro-Christian 
religious and cultural tradition,”151 so it can be difficult to disentangle 
tribal cultural traditions from European-influenced ones.
152
 This adds to 
the indeterminacy of invoking tradition to support or oppose tribal same-
 
 
 146. Diné Marriage Act, § 3, 20th Navajo Nation Council, CAP-29-05 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 147. Wilson, supra note 60, at 179. 
 148. Same-Sex Marriage Ban Becomes Law, supra note 110; see also RIFKIN, supra note 123, at 
21 (describing the Navajo same-sex marriage ban and arguing that “tradition” can be assimilationist 
and reflect imperialism). 
 149. Jacobi, supra note 123, at 828–29 (quoting Arnold Hamilton, Marriage Flight Taken to 
Cherokees: Lesbian Couple with License from Nation Now Battling to File It, DENTON REC.-CHRON., 
Aug. 16, 2005). 
 150. Wilson, supra note 60, at 178. 
 151. Id. at 186. 
 152. Just as the same self-determination argument justified both the Oneida’s ban on same-sex 
marriage and its institution of same-sex marriage, the same “tradition” argument (“Marriage is a 
foundation of Tribal society that stabilizes families which the Tribe acknowledges by recognizing the 
legal relationship of a union between two adults.”) also justifies both laws. ONEIDA TRIBE MARRIAGE 
LAW ch. 71, § 71.1 (2010); see also ONEIDA TRIBE MARRIAGE LAW ch. 71, § 71.1 (2015). 
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sex marriage. 
In sum, while the proponents and opponents of tribal same-sex 
marriage have many strategies, two (indeterminate) arguments are 
commonly invoked on both sides of the debate: tradition and self-
determination.
153
 Importantly, what these two values have in common is 
that they involve Native-society interiority, independent of (and 
sometimes opposed to) external influences.  
IV. THE INTERPLAY OF TRIBAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL LAW 
As explained above, tribal sovereigns’ arguments for and against same-
sex marriage are both separate from and connected to state and federal 
developments. Accordingly, a discussion of the interaction of laws at the 
tribal, state, and federal levels of government is in order. The first Subpart 
of this Part describes the general framework of American Indian law in 
Indian Country
154
 in connection with state and federal bodies of law. The 
second Subpart provides a more specific discussion of marriage at those 
respective levels of analysis. 
A. American Indian Law at the Tribal, State, and Federal Level 
American Indians’ national existence predates the Constitution and the 
founding of the United States.
155
 Accordingly, the legal status of American 
Indian law is a complex interaction of tribal, state, and federal laws. This 
Subpart does not aspire to cover all of the intricacies of Indian law 
comprehensively, but some pertinent aspects bear mentioning briefly. 
First, because of Native tribes’ historic presence on the North 
American continent, they are domestic nations, but because of the 
supremacy of US federal law, they are dependent ones.
156
 Thus, American 
Indian tribal sovereigns are sometimes described as “domestic dependent 
 
 
 153. Although this Note divides “self-determination” and “tradition” into separate sections, the 
reality may be that the two issues are the same or interrelated: 
[T]ribal members value tradition in their laws because tradition allows tribes to maintain their 
sovereign identities. Where tribes change legislation to mirror state and federal law, the end 
result is assimilation with general American identity and arguably a consequent loss of tribal 
identity. . . . [F]or many tribes tradition is law, and perhaps more importantly, tradition helps 
tribes maintain identities as sovereign entities and is fundamental to all tribal law.  
Jacobi, supra note 123, at 848. 
 154. “Indian Country” is a term of art defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2014). Briefly, “Indian 
Country” includes reservation land, “dependent Indian communities,” and Indian allotments. Id. 
 155. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 
384 (1896). 
 156. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831).  
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nations.”157 Tribal sovereigns have aspects of sovereignty (such as 
inherent authority over their own members) that inhere in nations and were 
not granted by the US government.
158
 As a corollary, states generally do 
not have regulatory authority over tribal members in Indian Country.
159
 
However, tribal sovereignty is limited by congressional plenary power to 
legislate over tribal affairs.
160
 The tension between inherent tribal 
sovereignty and the status of being subjected to federal plenary power is 
one of the hallmarks of American Indian law.
161
 
Since congressional plenary power over Native nations is so pervasive, 
it merits a description in a bit more depth. The Supreme Court has located 
the authority for Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs in the 
Constitution’s Indian Commerce Clause, the only non-obsolete mention of 
American Indians in the document.
162
 Congress’s plenary authority has 
been used to abrogate treaties,
163
 assume federal jurisdiction for crimes 
committed in Indian Country,
164
 define tribes,
165
 assume state jurisdiction 
over criminal and some civil issues in Indian Country,
166
 and even 
terminate tribes.
167
 Despite its volatile history and the almost limitless 
power of congressional plenary power, Congress seems to have settled 
into a policy of generally respecting tribes’ ability to retain local control 
over the reservation.
168
 
In contrast, the Supreme Court has been an even more unpredictable 
force in American Indian law. As Matthew Fletcher notes: 
 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Fletcher, supra note 6, at 66. 
 159. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561–62 (1832); Fletcher, supra note 6, at 66.  
 160. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 61. Congressional plenary power is extensive and includes, among 
other things, the power to abrogate rights codified in treaties between the federal government and 
tribes. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). 
 161. Kate Redburn, Navajo Equality? Gay Marriage and the Limits of Tribal Sovereignty, 
DISSENT MAG. (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/navajo-equality-gay-
marriage-and-the-limits-of-tribal-sovereignty (calling this tension the “fundamental contradiction at 
the heart of Native American constitutional law”). 
 162. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 61. The so-called Indian Commerce Clause is an enumerated power 
that authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3. 
 163. See, e.g., Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 (upholding Congress’s ability to abrogate a treaty 
provision requiring signatures from 75% of male members to cede land). 
 164. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886) (upholding the Major Crimes Act of 
1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153). 
 165. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913) (applying federal Indian statutes to the 
Pueblo). 
 166. Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18, 25 & 28 U.S.C.). 
 167. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 410 (1968).  
 168. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53 FED. LAW. 38, 
42 (2006).  
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In the end, the Supreme Court decides what the Constitution means. 
Although the Court granted almost unlimited deference to Congress 
when it made positive law in the field, where Congress has been 
silent or vague, the Court has taken the lead as both constitutional 
interpreter and, according to many legal authorities, national federal 
Indian policymaker.
169
 
Arguing that Justices feel unconstrained in their ability to decide Indian 
affairs,
170
 Fletcher points out that federal courts (including the US 
Supreme Court) “are slow to recognize the validity of exercises of tribal 
governmental authority.”171 As a result, the Supreme Court has typically 
favored state interests over tribal sovereignty, especially in recent times.
172
  
Another complicated aspect of American Indian law is the applicability 
of US constitutional rights to tribal members. Individual members of tribes 
are simultaneously citizens of the tribe, the state in which they reside, and 
the United States.
173
 As citizens of individual states and the United States, 
tribal members are afforded the protections of state and federal 
constitutions.
174
 But because tribes were not a party to the drafting of the 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights does not constrain tribal governments in 
Indian Country.
175
 
To remedy concerns about tribal sovereigns having unchecked power 
that could undercut federal constitutional rights, Congress passed the 
 
 
 169. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 67 (footnotes omitted). 
 170. Id. at 68. 
 171. Id. at 58. 
 172. Fletcher, supra note 168, at 41; see also Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: 
Indian Cases at the Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 4, 2016, 9:48 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/ 
01/scotus-for-law-students-indian-cases-at-the-court/ (noting that in the last twenty-nine years, the 
Supreme Court has “ruled against the interests of Indians” 72% of the time).  
 173. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 63; see also Redburn, supra note 161 (“It seems to raise the 
possibility that the Supreme Court could strip away parts of tribal authority however it wants, 
regardless of the relevant tribal laws.”). 
 174. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 175. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns pre-
existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those 
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”); Fletcher, 
supra note 6, at 64–65. For this reason, Indian law is sometimes called “extraconstitutional,” or “sui 
generis.” Id. at 62; see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328–30 (1978), superseded by 
statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (finding that 
the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy provision does not constrain the Cherokee Tribe); Talton v. 
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (finding that the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury provision does not 
constrain the Cherokee Tribe). Curiously, the exception to this rule seems to be the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment’s establishment of the voting age at eighteen. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 77–78 (citing 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that the tribe’s 
secretarial election was “federal” enough for the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to allow those eighteen 
and older to vote)). 
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Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”), pursuant to its plenary power 
over Indian affairs.
176
 ICRA establishes many (but not all) of the rights in 
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment in Indian Country, 
including an “equal protection” and a “due process” provision.177 In a 
sense, ICRA mandates that tribal sovereigns import certain rights similar 
to those under the US Constitution. Because tribal sovereigns have 
sovereign immunity, this leaves ICRA-based claims to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of tribal courts (unless the plaintiff is seeking a federal habeas 
remedy).
178
 
In sum, tribal sovereigns retain inherent aspects of self-government that 
are subject only to congressional plenary power, but Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has also found a way to limit tribal authority in some 
situations. Still, states are generally prohibited from regulating conduct 
within Indian Country.
179
 The issue of federal rights applying to tribes is 
especially complicated, and ICRA imports some Constitutional rights into 
Indian Country.
180
 
B. Relevant Tribal, State, and Federal Law on Marriage 
Having given an overview of the way that federal, state, and Native 
tribal law interact generally, this Subpart turns to a more focused analysis 
of the relationship between federal, state, and tribal laws concerning 
marriage. 
1. Inherent Tribal Authority over Domestic Relations 
Since tribes have inherent authority as sovereigns, they “have been 
accorded the widest possible latitude in regulating the domestic relations 
of their members.”181 Federal and state statutes and courts consistently 
recognize American Indian custom as the ultimate arbiter of tribal 
 
 
 176. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2014). 
 177. Id. ICRA does not include provisions analogous to the US Constitution’s “free exercise” or 
“establishment” clauses, a right to bear arms, or the right to indigent defense counsel, among others. 
See id. 
 178. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49 (holding that ICRA did not abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity for non-habeas claims, and that the Santa Clara Pueblo’s sovereign immunity barred federal 
adjudication of an ICRA-based claim relating to membership requirements). 
 179. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561–62 (1832). 
 180. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303. 
 181. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 137 (1942) (footnote 
omitted); see also Fletcher, supra note 6, at 54 (quoting COHEN, supra, at 215) (“It remains settled 
black-letter law, however, that Indian tribes retain plenary and exclusive inherent authority over 
‘domestic relations among tribal members.’”); Strasser, supra note 39, at 208. 
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marriages.
182
 The untouchability of tribal domestic relations and marriage 
custom has even largely withstood the volatile history of federal plenary 
authority that abrogated treaties and terminated tribes.
183
  
It should not be surprising, therefore, that courts almost always 
recognize the “validity of marriages and divorces consummated in 
accordance with tribal law or custom.”184 With one possible exception,185 
state laws generally have no impact on the “hard inner core of tribal 
authority over domestic relations,”186 even though tribal members are also 
state citizens.
187
 Historically, states have recognized tribal marriages, 
treating them with at least as much deference as foreign marriages.
188
 This 
was true even for polygamous tribal marriages.
189
 The most famous case to 
this effect is Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Company.
190
 In Kobogum, 
Michigan’s Supreme Court upheld the inheritance rights of children in a 
polygamous tribal marriage, and in the process of doing so recognized the 
marriage as valid.
191
 The Kobogum court famously held that it had no right 
to control tribal marriages, stating: 
We must either hold that there can be no valid Indian marriage, or 
we must hold that all marriages are valid which by Indian usage are 
 
 
 182. COHEN, supra note 181, at 137; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS 
§ 26 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2016) (“Indian tribes have the power to regulate the domestic relations 
of tribal members.”).  
 183. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 54. It is worth noting that Congress has enacted statutes that touch 
on issues relating to tribal domestic relations, but these statutes do not constrain tribal authority to 
regulate domestic relations. For example, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–
1963 (2014), explicitly recognizes tribal authority over certain adoptions of minor Native American 
children. Interestingly, the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) 
(“DOMA”), also purported to confer tribal authority to refuse recognition of same-sex marriages from 
other jurisdictions, including other tribal sovereigns. But because tribal governments already have full 
authority to regulate domestic relations, DOMA’s purported authorization was “superfluous.” See 
Tweedy, supra note 38, at 133. For an explanation of inter-tribal recognition of tribal court orders 
generally, see Steven J. Gunn, Compacts, Confederacies, and Comity: Intertribal Enforcement of 
Tribal Court Orders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 297 (2004).  
 184. COHEN, supra note 181, at 138; Strasser, supra note 39, at 218 (“Indeed, as a general matter, 
courts finding a marriage valid under tribal laws would also find it valid under state laws as long as the 
marriage did not involve the imposition of fraud on any other jurisdiction.”).  
 185. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 186. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 80. 
 187. COHEN, supra note 181, at 137. 
 188. Strasser, supra note 39, at 224. Although it appears that some states threatened to decline 
recognition of tribal marriages unless the tribes instituted a ban on same-sex marriage, see supra note 
53 and accompanying text, there appear to be no instances of states following through on such threats.  
 189. COHEN, supra note 181, at 138 (“Legal recognition has not been withheld from marriages by 
Indian custom, even in those cases where Indian custom sanctioned polygamy.”); Strasser, supra note 
39, at 208. 
 190. Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602 (Mich. 1889). 
 191. Id. at 605–06; see also Fletcher, supra note 6, at 53. 
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so regarded. There is no middle ground which can be taken, so long 
as our own laws are not binding on the tribes. They did not occupy 
their territory by our grace and permission, but by a right beyond 
our control. They were placed by the constitution of the United 
States beyond our jurisdiction, and we had no more right to control 
their domestic usages than those of Turkey or India.
192
 
The court went on to reason that tribal domestic relations could not be 
subject to state laws, which had never bound tribes.
193
 Other historical 
examples of states recognizing tribal marriages under Kobogum’s logic 
abound.
194
  
Along with states, the federal government has also historically 
recognized tribal custom marriages.
195
 Congress settled on a policy to 
allow tribal sovereigns to govern their own domestic relations.
196
 And 
although there is a modicum of uncertainty as to whether generally 
applicable laws apply in Indian Country, it is settled that Native nations 
still retain their inherent authority to “make their own laws and be 
governed by them,” especially in the area of domestic relations.197 
2. Public Law 280  
Still, congressional plenary authority can strip even this inherent power 
of tribal sovereigns. One example of this may be “Public Law 280,” which 
gives six “mandatory” states—Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Oregon, and Wisconsin—some civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indian 
Country, in addition to criminal jurisdiction.
198
 In addition to the six states 
explicitly mentioned in Public Law 280, Idaho and Washington have 
assumed “optional” Public Law 280 jurisdiction for specific issue areas, 
including domestic relations.
199
  
 
 
 192. Kobogum, 43 N.W. at 605. 
 193. Id. at 605–06. 
 194. See, e.g., Hallowell v. Commons, 210 F. 793, 800 (8th Cir. 1914); Earl v. Godley, 44 N.W. 
254, 255 (Minn. 1890); Ortley v. Ross, 110 N.W. 982, 983 (Neb. 1907); James v. Adams, 155 P. 1121, 
1122 (Okla. 1915). 
 195. See, e.g., United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 606 (1916) (holding that a US statute 
criminalizing adultery would not apply to Indian domestic relations absent clear intent by Congress to 
use its plenary authority over tribes).  
 196. Quiver, 241 U.S. at 603–04. But congressional plenary authority over Indian tribes vests the 
federal government with the power to change this. See id. at 606; see also Strasser, supra note 39, at 
209–10. 
 197. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 79 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959)).  
 198. Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 2, 67 Stat. 588, 588–89 (1953) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1360). 
 199. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5101 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 37.12.010 (LexisNexis 
2014). 
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This means that eight states (Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Oregon, Wisconsin, Idaho, and Washington) may be able to adjudicate 
issues of tribal domestic relations, including marriage. Since Obergefell 
held that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right, all eight of these 
states must now have legal same-sex marriage.
200
 At the publication of this 
Note, at least three tribal sovereigns have same-sex marriage bans (and 
therefore marriage laws that conflict with local state law) in the relevant 
Public Law 280 states: the Blue Lake Rancheria (California),
201
 the 
Kalispel Indian Community (Washington),
202
 and the Nez Perce (Idaho).
203
  
It remains unclear whether a state-court challenge to these tribes’ bans 
would allow application of state law under Public Law 280, or if the 
tribes’ inherent authority to govern their own domestic relations would 
prevail. Civil jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280 is a murky area, to 
say the least, especially when applied to the special status of tribal 
domestic relations. Civil authority pursuant to Public Law 280 is not 
regulatory, but rather adjudicatory, allowing state courts to hear cases from 
Indian Country and apply state laws, even where there would typically be 
tribal or federal exclusive jurisdiction.
204
 For example, while California 
cannot directly regulate tribal domestic issues,
205
 Public Law 280 would 
apparently allow California courts to hear and decide cases regarding tribal 
family matters and even apply California domestic-relations law, assuming 
such law is not considered “regulatory.”206 While it appears as though 
Public Law 280 jurisdiction can apply even to tribal domestic relations,
207
 
there are examples of courts overturning some state exercises of Public 
Law 280 authority.
208
 Accordingly, Public Law 280 could potentially play 
 
 
 200. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 201. See supra note 81. 
 202. See supra note 83. 
 203. See supra note 86. 
 204. See Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 391–92 (1976) (holding that Public Law 280 did not 
grant Minnesota the authority to tax tribes, but only the power to adjudicate and apply state law). 
 205. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561–62 (1832); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF 
AMERICAN INDIANS § 26 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2016). 
 206. See Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority over Indian 
Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 934 (2012) (citing Doe v. Mann, 415 
F.3d 1038, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the Ninth Circuit determined that a state’s dependency 
proceeding that terminated parental rights was not “regulatory” and was therefore within the scope of 
Public Law 280’s conferral of authority)). 
 207. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 35 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7558 
(“[C]ourts have consistently recognized that tribal governments have exclusive jurisdiction over the 
domestic relationships of tribal members located on reservations, unless a State has assumed 
concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to Federal legislation such as Public Law 83–280.”).  
 208. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 900 F.2d 1164, 1166–68 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that South Dakota’s assumption of optional Public Law 280 jurisdiction over state highways 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/8
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an important, if inconclusive, role in the interplay between state and tribal 
domestic relations laws.
209
 
V. OBERGEFELL’S LIMITED IMPACT ON TRIBAL SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
LAWS 
Obergefell should have only limited, if any, implications for tribal 
marriage laws. This is not a statement about the merits of marriage 
equality, but rather about federal American Indian law. As explained in 
Part I, Obergefell held that states must issue marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples and recognize valid same-sex marriages from other states.
210
 The 
Court rested its holding on both due process and equal protection 
grounds.
211
 Throughout the opinion, the Court emphasized marriage’s 
important role in culture, and especially noted that “the Nation’s traditions 
make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.”212  
But even as correct as marriage equality may be, Native nations need 
not subscribe to the “social order” of the United States. In fact, as Part II 
illustrated, tribal sovereigns can have any host of permutations of marriage 
laws. And as Part III demonstrated, all of this pluralism among Native 
sovereigns can arguably be rooted in tribal traditions and self-
determinative interests. Although federal law can trump tribal interests in 
many important ways, as explained in Part IV, Obergefell will and should 
have only an indirect influence over marriage laws in Indian Country.  
Unlike the Sixth Circuit’s opinion that was granted certiorari, 
Obergefell made no reference to Native Americans.
213
 Obergefell’s 
holding that states’ bans on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional does 
 
 
in Indian country was inconsistent with the purpose of Public Law 280). 
 209. Before Obergefell, prior drafts of this Note included a discussion of DOMA. DOMA’s 
Section Three, which prohibited federal recognition of same-sex marriages, was overruled in United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Section Two survived Windsor, and purported to give every 
“State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe” the right to refuse recognition of 
same-sex marriages. DOMA § 2. DOMA was notable, but not unique, in its explicit inclusion of tribal 
sovereigns. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 58; Tweedy, supra note 38, at 106. Still, while Obergefell did not 
explicitly overturn DOMA’s Section Two, it is essentially a dead letter, since all states must license 
and recognize valid same-sex marriages. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015). Even 
DOMA’s purported authorization to tribal sovereigns to deny marriage recognition is without 
substance. See supra note 183. 
 210. See supra Part I; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05.  
 211. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 212. Id. at 2601 (emphasis added). 
 213. See supra note 36. In its decision to uphold state same-sex marriage bans, the Sixth Circuit 
only made one passing mention of “Native Americans” in reference to the court’s argument that not all 
marriage restrictions have historically been subject to strict scrutiny. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 
412 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting COTT, supra note 35) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he federal 
government encouraged or forced Native Americans to adopt [monogamy].”).  
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not amount to requiring Indian tribes to implement pro-same-sex marriage 
laws.
214
 The decision does not change the traditional deference to Native 
tribes’ inherent authority on matters of their own domestic relations.215 
Thus, tribal implementations of same-sex marriage—like the Coquille’s— 
and tribal bans on same-sex marriage—like the Navajo Nation’s—remain 
intact.  
For tribal sovereigns that already allow for same-sex marriage, 
Obergefell’s only impact may be that same-sex, tribal-member couples 
who were married under tribal law will now have their marriages 
recognized in all fifty states. 
For tribal sovereigns that ban same-sex marriage, Obergefell may have 
important but only indirect consequences, through one of two routes. First, 
it may catalyze grassroots movements within Native communities to 
convince tribal councils to change laws. Since Obergefell was a high-
profile case,
216
 it can go far to motivate tribal members to push back 
against tribal same-sex marriage bans. The momentum of this blockbuster 
decision may inspire grassroots, civic-movement organizations, such as 
the Navajo Nation’s Coalition for Navajo Equality.217 This strategy has 
proven effective in the past, and it may work best in small tribes.
218
 
The second indirect effect Obergefell may have is supporting tribal-
court ICRA challenges to tribal bans on same-sex marriage.
219
 Because 
Obergefell rested on the Fourteenth Amendment,
220
 the opinion may 
provide persuasive authority to plaintiffs who argue that tribal same-sex 
 
 
 214. The only possible exception to this would be the states with jurisdiction under Public Law 
280, see supra Part IV.B.2, but Obergefell did not change the situation because California, Idaho, and 
Washington (the only “P.L. 280” states with local tribal sovereigns that banned same-sex marriage) 
had already legalized same-sex marriage prior to Obergefell. See Alex Tribou & Keith Collins, This Is 
How Fast America Changes Its Mind, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
graphics/2015-pace-of-social-change/.  
 215. See supra Part IV.B.1.  
 216. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-
marriage.html (noting that the historic decision “set off jubilation and tearful embraces across the 
country, the first same-sex marriages in several states, and resistance—or at least stalling—in others”).  
 217. See COAL. FOR DINÉ EQUAL., supra note 96; see also Brave NoiseCat, supra note 4 (noting 
that “[h]uge court decisions, like [Obergefell], definitely empower” conversations about marriage 
equality).  
 218. Tweedy, supra note 38, at 142 (noting that grassroots movements among tribal members 
result in more pro-same-sex-marriage laws than bans, and that grassroots movements may be 
“particularly effective for those who are members of small tribes”).  
 219. A tribal member-plaintiff will not be able to bring such a challenge in state or federal court 
because of tribes’ sovereign immunity. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) 
(holding that tribal sovereign immunity barred federal adjudication of an ICRA-based challenge to 
tribal law).  
 220. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).  
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marriage bans cannot withstand ICRA’s “equal protection” or “due 
process” guarantees. While Obergefell does not bind tribal courts, tribal 
judges may give the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis persuasive 
weight when interpreting ICRA’s “due process” or “equal protection” 
provisions.
221
 Because ICRA-based challenges to tribal same-sex marriage 
bans are more likely after Obergefell, this Note explores this possibility in 
more depth. 
A. Tribal-Court ICRA Challenges to Bans on Same-Sex Marriage  
As a practical matter, Professor Ann E. Tweedy hypothesizes that tribal 
members may be less likely to resort to tribal courts to challenge tribal 
same-sex-marriage bans.
222
 But there is at least one documented case, 
post-Obergefell, of a tribal member challenging a tribal sovereign’s 
restrictive marriage law.
223
 Cleo Pablo, a member of the Ak-Chin Indian 
Community, is suing in tribal court to challenge the Ak-Chin’s ban on 
same-sex marriage.
224
 With one documented case in Indian Country, it is 
likely that more will follow. It is also worth noting that challenging tribal 
law via ICRA and Obergefell will “take years, perhaps decades of (likely) 
Tribal Court litigation.”225  
Once a tribal court is faced with an ICRA or tribal-constitutional 
challenge to a ban on same-sex marriage, the question becomes whether 
the tribal court will follow the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision.226 
Ultimately, tribal courts may or may not look to federal law for 
guidance.
227
 One commentator points out that the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 
 221. See Ann E. Tweedy, Tribes, Same-Sex Marriage, and Obergefell v. Hodges, FED. LAW., 
Oct.–Nov. 2015, at 6, 7, available at https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/tweedy-on-same-
sex-marriage.pdf (“If faced with a lawsuit challenging a tribal DOMA under ICRA, however, it 
appears that many tribes would apply Obergefell as persuasive authority and strike down the tribal 
DOMA.”).  
 222. See id.; see also Tweedy, supra note 38, at 109 (noting that a lack of tribal case law “suggests 
that tribal members are much less likely than other Americans to go to court to enforce marriage 
rights”). Also, the availability of a tribal judicial forum may vary from tribe to tribe because of 
sovereign immunity. See generally Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 137 (2004).  
 223. See Fonseca, supra note 80. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Anthony Broadman, ICRA, Obergefell, and Tribal Marriage Equality, GALANDRA 
BROADMAN (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.galandabroadman.com/2015/04/icra-obergefell-and-tribal-
marriage-equality. 
 226. See Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1056 (2007) 
(noting that increasing claims against tribal governments raises the question about to what extent a 
tribal government may deviate from dominant liberal norms). Riley argues that tribal governments 
should not feel constrained by western notions of good governance, but should instead work towards 
“good Native governance.” Id. at 1055. 
 227. See Tweedy, supra note 38, at 150–51. 
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and ICRA’s analogous guarantees are not coextensive, but they might 
overlap on the issue of same-sex marriage.
228
 Still, as Mark D. Rosen 
notes, tribal governments are free to interpret ICRA’s provisions however 
they wish—even those provisions based on constitutional rights that have 
been interpreted by the Supreme Court: “[D]ue process means one thing in 
Manhattan, another in the 25,000 square miles of Navajo land, and yet 
something else on the Winnebago reservation.”229  
Tribal interpretations of ICRA are not capricious, however. Rosen’s 
study found that tribal governments “take their charge of interpreting 
ICRA seriously” and have empirically limited their own power in 
significant ways, including striking down provisions that violate due 
process and equal protection.
230
 Rosen found that tribal courts often give 
deference to federal constitutional law, which is “cited in nearly every 
tribal court opinion and plays an important role in tribal court construction 
of ICRA.”231 Indeed, Rosen’s study found that “much of the ICRA case 
law bears a significant resemblance to federal constitutional law.”232 This 
makes sense, given that tribal courts will often have less of a body of 
precedent and prior case law from which to draw. The link between tribal 
law and federal law may also be why the Coquille Tribe, in drafting its 
marriage law, incorporated language about “fundamental rights,” 
implicitly invoking federal jurisprudence on marriage rights.
233
  
B. When Should Tribal Courts Apply Obergefell? 
Since tribal courts occasionally look to federal constitutional law, when 
should tribal courts look to Obergefell? Professor Tweedy suggests that 
tribal courts should look to federal case law like Windsor and Obergefell 
when there is a lack of “available information on tribal custom and 
tradition either in the context of same-sex relationships or as to equal 
 
 
 228. “The 14th Amendment and the ICRA Equal Protection clause . . . are not coequals. . . . They 
do not even mean the same thing. But if the United States Supreme Court finds that the federal Equal 
Protection clause prohibits marriage discrimination, ICRA Equal Protection likely does, too.” 
Broadman, supra note 225.  
 229. Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of 
Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 483 (2000). 
 230. Id. at 523–24. 
 231. Id. at 524. 
 232. Id. at 529; accord Tweedy, supra note 38, at 151 (“[A] significant number of tribes look to 
federal constitutional cases when construing ICRA-based rights in the absence of tribal precedent or 
readily available information on tribal tradition and custom . . . .”).  
 233. Tweedy, supra note 38, at 113–14 (citing COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBAL CODE § 740.010(2) 
(2008) (noting that “Marriages and Domestic Partnerships involving tribal members are fundamental 
rights”)).  
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protection and due process generally.”234 Writing after Windsor but before 
Obergefell, she argued that: 
[T]ribes should apply Windsor as persuasive authority unless there 
is clear evidence of tribal custom and tradition that points to a 
different approach with respect to same-sex relationships. . . . 
[T]ribal courts sometimes consider federal approaches and cases in 
conjunction with approaches from other tribes, and, in such 
situations (and similar ones), it makes sense for Windsor to play a 
significant role in a multi-faceted analysis, rather than playing the 
starring role.
235
  
Tweedy would have tribal courts “require solid evidence to avoid allowing 
contemporary prejudice to masquerade as tribal tradition.”236 Thus, she 
advocates applying the Supreme Court cases unless a tribal sovereign can 
meet a substantial evidentiary standard: “[T]ribal courts should require 
some clear evidence of a tradition or custom of lack of openness to same-
sex relationships or LGBT identities as a justification for not applying 
either Windsor or tribally-derived protections against discrimination in a 
marriage equality case under the ICRA.”237 Although she mentions 
Windsor, it seems as though her argument applies equally to Obergefell.
238
 
Professor Tweedy’s argument is valuable because it recognizes that 
tribal law should be rooted in tribal history and tradition rather than in 
federal law.
239
 But the presumption that tribal courts should apply 
Obergefell absent “clear evidence” of a tribal history of excluding same-
sex marriage is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it is unclear 
whether oral history would meet Professor Tweedy’s “clear evidence” 
standard.
240
 Considering that documented information related to the status 
of same-sex couples in tribal histories is limited and difficult to detangle 
 
 
 234. Id. at 151.  
 235. Id. at 153.  
 236. Id. at 154. 
 237. Id. at 155 (emphasis added).  
 238. See Tweedy, supra note 221, at 7 (“If faced with a lack of information as to tribal culture and 
tradition, as most tribal courts would be, many would likely apply Obergefell.”); see also Broadman, 
supra note 225 (citing Professor Tweedy’s article on Windsor and noting that “[t]he same will be true 
for Obergefell”).  
 239. See Tweedy, supra note 38, at 149 (“[A] requirement that tribal courts protect due process 
and equal-protection [rights] . . . in exactly the same way that the states and federal government do 
would have an assimilating effect on tribal culture.”).  
 240. For discussions about the role and admissibility of tribal oral history in US courts, see 
generally Rachel Awan, Comment, Native American Oral Traditional Evidence in American Courts: 
Reliable Evidence or Useless Myth?, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 697 (2014); Hope M. Babcock, “[This] I 
Know from My Grandfather:” The Battle for Admissibility of Indigenous Oral History as Proof of 
Tribal Land Claims, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 19 (2013).  
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from colonialist accounts of tribal culture,
241
 oral history will likely be a 
useful tool for tribal courts reviewing an ICRA challenge to tribal 
marriage laws.  
Second, automatically applying Obergefell absent clear evidence of a 
tribal history to justify bans on same-sex-marriage would undermine self-
determination. While many tribal sovereigns will want to look to past 
practices and customs in ascertaining tribal law, self-determination is also 
forward-looking.
242
 As Tim Rowse puts it:  
Indigenous self-determination is both backward-looking and 
forward-looking; it is not only conservative and restorative, but also 
exploratory of progressive change. Self-determination necessitates a 
politics of cultural revision and adaptation in which Indigenous 
people cannot avoid debating among themselves what elements of 
their traditions they wish to preserve and what they would give up 
for the sake of adaptive innovation. Unavoidably, such debate 
among Indigenous people takes place in a context shaped by non-
Indigenous political authorities and by global structures of 
economic opportunity and exploitation; self-determining Indigenous 
peoples have not chosen these contexts, nor can they ignore them.
243
 
This means that tribal sovereigns should be free to write marriage laws 
that are in the best interests (including culturally) of the Native nation, 
regardless of history. This may align with Obergefell for some tribal 
sovereigns, but not for all.
244
  
An important counterargument to the idea that tribal courts should be 
fully empowered to determine their own tribal marriage laws is that tribal 
judges may be improperly influenced by external pressures, which might 
even perpetuate colonialist and assimilationist values.
245
 Professor Tweedy 
 
 
 241. Tweedy, supra note 221, at 7; see also supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text. 
 242. Tim Rowse, Self-Determination as Self-Transformation, in RESTORING INDIGENOUS SELF-
DETERMINATION: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES 34, 34 (Marc Woons ed., 2015), 
available at http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Restoring-Indigenous-Self-Determination-
New-Version-E-IR.pdf.  
 243. Id. 
 244. See Rosen, supra note 229, at 525 (noting that tribal courts “do not merely parrot federal 
approaches,” but rather adopt them when they align nicely with tribal values, and diverge when 
necessary). The idea that tribal courts should apply Obergefell only when it makes sense from a tribal 
perspective aligns with Riley’s argument for good Native governance. See Riley, supra note 226, at 
1055. 
 245. It may even be true that any inquiry into history will necessarily invite a colonialist tendency 
towards heterosexism. See RIFKIN, supra note 123, at 22 (“[T]he effort to locate a particular set of 
practices and/or principles as tradition takes place within a context in which there are numerous 
incentives toward straightness and in which adopting (aspects of) heteronormativity can serve as a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/8
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notes, “from the information we have about Cherokee and Navajo, we 
know that adoption of tribal [bans on same-sex marriage] is inspired at 
least in some instances by political developments in the dominant culture, 
rather than by tribal customs and traditions.”246 She also notes that 
heterosexism has historically been used as a tool of colonization, 
marginalizing Native kinship systems and other Native family values.
247
 
Indeed, many see the Navajo Nation’s ban on same-sex marriage as a 
reflection of US policy at the time and certain non-Native Christian 
values, undermining Navajo self-determination.
248
  
These are important concerns, and Professor Tweedy is apt to advocate 
for caution among tribal courts when considering tribal marriage laws.
249
 
Still, like arguments about tradition and self-determination,
250
 arguments 
about eschewing external influences are indeterminate. For example, while 
some blame the Navajo marriage ban on external influence from the 
dominant culture, others see advocacy for same-sex marriage as equally 
foreign to tribal culture and tradition.
251
 While requiring “clear evidence” 
of custom and tradition may alleviate some indeterminacy, it likely will 
not solve all situations. It might also shackle tribal courts to a backward-
looking view of self-determination, which is contrary to true self-rule and 
sovereignty.
252
 Thus, there is no formula for tribal courts reviewing ICRA 
challenges to bans on same-sex marriage.  
CONCLUSION 
If the current landscape of tribal laws on same-sex marriage and the 
arguments being made from both sides are any indication, tribal courts 
will vary widely in their determination of marriage rights. In each case, 
both sides will likely argue that tradition is in their favor. And tribal courts 
may even base the reasons for their decisions outside of tribal history and 
tradition. This kind of indeterminacy and pluralism amongst tribal 
 
 
means of carving out space for certain kinds of indigenous association, belief, and practice.”).  
 246. Tweedy, supra note 38, at 156.  
 247. Id. at 156–57; see also RIFKIN, supra note 123, at 22. 
 248. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 38, at 134–36. 
 249. Id. at 158. 
 250. See supra Part III. 
 251. See Brave NoiseCat, supra note 4 (noting that many tribal members “view same-sex 
marriage as a foreign imposition creeping into Navajo life from cities like Albuquerque and San 
Francisco”).  
 252. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples demonstrates how true 
sovereignty and self-determination involve flexibility: “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.” G.A. Res. 61/295, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 
13, 2007) (emphasis added).  
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courts—and indeed, amongst tribal family structures, as Part III 
discussed—is necessary if tribal sovereignty and self-determination are to 
have meaning.
253
 Tribal sovereigns, including tribal courts,
254
 are the only 
actors that can appropriately determine tribal marriage laws. This means 
that Obergefell should have limited effect in Indian Country, and the word 
“should” in this sentence is both predictive and normative. American 
Indian tribal sovereigns’ inherent right to self-govern “existed prior to the 
Constitution” and does not stem from it.255 Indian nations have “always 
been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining 
 
 
 253. Riley notes that tribal sovereignty and self-rule are key to Native nations’ very existence. 
Riley, supra note 226, at 1063 (“[W]ithout self-rule, tribes will not only disappear as political entities 
within the United States, they may cease to exist altogether.”). 
 254. See Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (2014) (finding that tribal-court adjudication 
is central to tribal self-determination and sovereignty).  
 255. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). 
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their original natural rights.”256 If this means anything, then the ultimate 
arbiter of tribal domestic affairs must be the tribes, themselves, as against 
all others—even the US Supreme Court.  
Steven J. Alagna

 
 
 
 256. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). 
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